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State Action and the Supreme
Court's Emerging Consensus on
the Line Between
Establishment and Private
Religious Expression
Michael W. McConnell'

October Term 1999 looked, on the surface, like a continuation of the longrunning religion wars on the Supreme Court. There were two cases involving
religion, raising two of the most contentious hot-button issues in the entire field:
school prayer and aid to religious schools. Both cases were decided by six-to-three
majorities, and both cases occasioned impassioned dissents. The "liberals" won
one, and the "conservatives" won one. Judging from the rhetoric, the two sides
are as far apart as ever. In Sante Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the
school prayer case, conservative dissenters claimed that the majority "distorts
existing precedent" and "bristles with hostility to all things religious in public
life."' In Mitchell v. Helms, the school aid case, liberal dissenters characterized
the plurality opinion as "a doctrinal coup" and accused those who joined the
opinion of "attacking the most fundamental assumption underlying the
Establishment Clause, that government can in fact operate with neutrality in its
relation to religion."'
Two decisions, so closely divided and won by opposite sides, may not appear
to be promising material for bringing harmony and coherence to what the lower
court in one of the cases called "the vast, perplexing desert" of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.3 Yet I will make that claim. Shorn of their
confrontational rhetoric, these cases strongly suggest that the Court is on the verge
of consensus regarding the fundamental values served by the Establishment
Clause. Although expressed in somewhat different language, the principle of the

*. Presidential Professor, University of Utah College of Law. The author presented oral argument
in Mitchell v. Helms on behalf of the petitioners, who prevailed, and wrote an amicus curiae brief in support
of the petitioners in Santa Fe Independent School Districtv. Doe, who did not. He also briefed or argued
a number of the other cases cited and discussed in this paper.
1. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 120 U.S. 2266, 2283 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
2. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2596-97 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
3. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).

majority opinion in Santa Fe, written by liberal, separationist Justice John Paul
Stevens, is essentially identical to the principle of the plurality opinion in Mitchell,
written by conservative, accommodationist Justice Clarence Thomas. Both
opinions treat as decisive the question: Was the religious activity that took place
properly attributable to the government or to private parties? If attributable to the
government, then the legal arrangements supporting the religious activity are
unconstitutional, as an establishment of religion. If attributable to private parties,
then the legal arrangements are permissible, and any attempt to censor or
discriminate against private religious activity would, at a minimum, raise serious
questions under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses.
In short, the emerging Establishment Clause jurisprudence can be seen as a
specialized application of the state action doctrine. Contrary to popular
impression, the Establishment Clause is not "hostile," nor is it favorable, to
religion; it stands for the proposition that religious activity and advocacy must be
a product of the private judgments of individuals and groups. If religious activity
is instigated, encouraged, or-in the strongest case-coerced by the government, the
government's acts are unconstitutional. But if religious activity is the product of
private judgment, it is permissible-even welcome-within the public sphere.
Thus, religion must be private in its provenance, but need not be private in its
expression or effect, and need not be cut off from public forums and generally
available public programs. The public sphere must be neutral and pluralistic; it
need not be secular.
The "state action" line is a useful way to address issues under the Religion
Clauses because the values served by the Religion Clauses depend-perhaps more
than any other constitutional questions-on the distinction between public and
private. Most constitutional provisions concern conduct that is wrongful, whether
engaged in by private or public actors. For example, the Equal Protection Clause
also has a state action requirement, but racial discrimination is generally odious
and, in most cases, illegal, whether practiced by public or private parties. The
taking of private property without just compensation is called stealing when done
by a private person and unconstitutional when done by the state. The Religion
Clauses are different. Precisely the same conduct-leading prayers, for example-is
constitutionally valued and protected if engaged in by private parties, though
unconstitutional ifdone by the government. Unlike most constitutional provisions,
therefore, the Religion Clauses are not about wrongful conduct but about ensuring
that the time, manner, degree, and theological substance of religious activityin the
nation are determined by individuals, families, religious groups, and other private
associations. The evil against which the Establishment Clause is directed is not
religion, but government control over religion.
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I. MITCHELL V. HELMS
Mitchell v. Helms involved the constitutionality of a federal program, Chapter
2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 198 1,' which provides
an equal per-student subsidy to public school districts to purchase computers,
computer software, library books, and other instructional materials for the use of
students attending accredited public or private schools, including religiously
affiliated private schools.5 The plaintiffs, federal taxpayers, contended that this
program violated the Establishment Clause by subsidizing education in religious
schools.6 Under the terms of the program, recipients of the materials were
permitted to use them only for "secular, neutral, and nonideological purposes."7
However, the plaintiffs argued-with some plausibility-that in light of the nature
of the materials, there could be no assurance that these restrictions were faithfully
obeyed or enforced. 8 For example, while a computer might be provided for use
in computer-aided mathematics instruction, there is no reliable way to ensure that
it could not also be used to access religious materials. Similarly, while a work of
literature might be appropriate for secular study, a teacher in a religious school
might use it to illustrate religious or theological themes.
The lawsuit targeted the Chapter 2 program in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana,
one of the most Catholic counties in the nation.9 Approximately thirty percent of
the student population in Jefferson Parish. attends private schools-the large
majority of which are Roman Catholic-and therefore, thirty percent of the Chapter
2 funds were allocated to those schools.'0 Plaintiffs conducted four years of
intensive discovery, designed to uncover instances in which Chapter 2 materials
were used for religious instruction." Their efforts were mostly unavailing. 2 They
discovered that some 191 library books of a religious nature had been purchased
with Chapter 2 funds, but this violation was discovered and corrected prior to the
litigation.' 3 They found that audio visual equipment had been used in religion

4. The program was originally enacted as Title II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965. It has been repeatedly reauthorized, with minor amendments, since that time. It is now codified
at 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301-7373 (1994).
5. Id. §7351.
6. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2537.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 7372(a)(1).
8. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2545-49.
9. Id. at 2537.
10. Id.at 2538.
II. Id. at 2554-55.
12. Id. at 2555, 2571-72.
13. Id. at 2555, 2571,2595.

classes but could not establish that the equipment had been purchased with
Chapter 2 funds.' 4 They found that in at least one instance, Chapter 2 computers
were networked with other computers, so that the Chapter 2 computers would
support the entire system in case of a breakdown. 5 They found that recordkeeping, labeling, and monitoring was sometimes lax.' 6 On cross-motions for
summary judgment, based on this record, the district court found that there was
no direct evidence of substantial violations. 7 The Court of Appeals neither
affirmed nor reversed that finding, relying instead on the categorical view that the
government may never provide educational materials other than textbooks to
religious schools.'8 In the Supreme Court, however, the four Justices in the
plurality and the three Justices in the dissent concluded that there had been
violations of the secular use regulations. 1' The question was whether this
amounted to a constitutional violation.
There are three basic ways to resolve the issue of aid to private education.
The first is to bar all religious schools from receiving educational materials from
the state, on the ground that there is no effective way to ensure that such assistance
will not directly or indirectly subsidize the religious teaching that goes on in the
schools. The second is to allow religious schools to receive public assistance on
a neutral basis, provided that the assistance is used only for secular instruction and
not for religious teaching. The third is to allow all schools to participate in
generally available public programs, so long as the government has acted neutrally
in service of a secular purpose.
The Supreme Court has never adopted the first position. In its first school aid
decision, Everson v. Boardof Educationin 1947, the Court upheld a program that
provided subsidies for transportation to elementary and secondary schools,
including religious schools, over a strong dissent by Justice Rutledge, urging that
religious schools be excluded from all forms of public assistance.2' Since that
time, the Court has never attempted to return to the Rutledge position. For many
years, it attempted a version of the second approach, allowing some forms of aid
and disallowing others, based on the Court's perception of the risk that the aid
might be used for religious teaching. That led to an era of shifting, inconsistent,
and seemingly arbitrary decisions that will be described below. The question in
Mitchell was whether the Court would embrace the third: to allow religious
groups to participate on equal terms, without special restrictions on account of
their religious nature.

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. These incidents are discussed by the plurality, id. at 2554-54, the concurring Justices, id. at 257072 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and the dissent, id. at 2594-96 (Souter, J., dissenting).
17. The district court opinion is unreported,
18. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 374 (5th Cir. 1998).
19. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2554, 2591, 2594-96.
20. 330U.S. 1,41 (1947).
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The Mitchell litigation perfectly illustrates the great changes in the
Establishment Clause doctrine over the last fifty years. Had the constitutionality
of the program been decided thirty years ago, when it was first enacted, it probably
would have been upheld. In Board of Education v. Allen in 1968, the Supreme
Court held that it is constitutional for the states to provide textbooks for the use of
students in private, religious schools as long as the textbooks were secular in
content and were provided on a neutral basis to all schoolchildren. E' As late as
1971, the Court stated that the First Amendment "permitted the States to provide
church-related schools with secular, neutral, or nonideological services, facilities,
or materials."22 During this period, the Court also approved substantial public aid
to college level, religiously affiliated educatipnal institutions23 and an extension
of tax benefits to religious, nonprofit organizations.24
In the ensuing decade, however, the Court issued a series of decisions that
significantly narrowed the permissible reach of public aid to private religious
education. If Mitchell had been brought in the late 1970s, the plaintiffs would
almost certainly have won. In Meek v. Pittenger and Wolman v. Walter, a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for states to
provide to students attending religious schools a portion of the same educational
resources-such as maps, projectors, tape recorders, and science kits-provided to
public school students.' The Court reasoned that any "[s]ubstantial aid" to the
"educational functions" of "church-related elementary and secondary schools" is
unconstitutional.26 That principle would seem to cover computers, software, and
library books. The Court made no attempt to reconcile this principle with the
textbook case, the college aid cases, or the tax benefits case, and thus left
Establishment Clause doctrine in a self-contradictory muddle.
The new standard articulated by the Meek plurality sounded absolutist (no
substantial aid) but in practice entailed many questions of degree and
characterization, which would plague subsequent cases. How much aid is
"substantial"? How could the courts distinguish between aid to the "education
functions of the schools" and aid to the physical, psychological, social, and
pedagogical needs of the students? Moreover, how could the courts distinguish
between "pervasively sectarian" and "non-pervasively sectarian" institutions? The

21.

392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968).

22. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971).
23. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736
(1976); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
24. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
25. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,365-66 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,250 (1977).
Both cases were overruled by Mitchell. Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
26. Meek, 421 U.S. at 366.

difficulties became evident even in the next case, Wolman v. Walter. In Wolman,
a shifting plurality struck down public aid (1) for remedial services, including
speech, hearing, and psychological diagnosis and therapy, by public employees
on the premises of religiously affiliated schools; (2) for the loan of instructional
materials and equipment to students at religious schools; and (3) for transportation
from religious schools to secular sites for field trips.27 The plurality sustained
programs involving textbooks, standardized tests and grading, diagnostic services
by public employees on the premises of religious schools, and remedial services
by public employees off of those premises (even in portable classrooms parked
at the curb).28 A perusal of the opinion reveals, however, that the reasoning
applied to one form of aid was inconsistent with that applied to other forms of aid,
leading to the impression that the results were utterly arbitrary and chaotic. The
Court frankly acknowledged that it could not reconcile its holding to the textbook
case, which it nonetheless reaffirmed. 29
If ever a constitutional theory "prove[d] to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability, "3 it was the "no substantial aid" doctrine of Meek and
Wolman. The basic problem is that almost all inputs into education-books,
materials, staff, equipment, et cetera-are secular in content, but nearly all could
be used for (or at least contribute to) religious instruction. A textbook may be
secular, but an effective teacher could use it in a course of religious instruction.
Bricks and mortar are secular, but religious classes could meet inside the
classrooms. Even school lunches could be used in a religious way, if God is
thanked (as He typically is) at the beginning of the meal. To apply a secular use
test rigorously would invalidate virtually every form of aid. To apply it narrowly
would uphold virtually every form of aid. To strike a middle ground requires
inconsistent application of the standard.
Thus, commentators of every jurisprudential stripe, on and off the Court,
have criticized this line of cases for their incoherence and inconsistency.3 The
Court of Appeals in Mitchell commented "it is tempting to complain that the high
Court has instructed us confusingly. 3 2 Perhaps the best-known comment on the

27.
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 244, 250, 255.
28. Id. at 238, 244, 248.
29.
Id. at 251-52, 237-38.
30. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
31.
See, e.g., LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
128-29 (1986); Thomas Berg, Religion ClauseAnti- Theories, 72 NOTREDAMEL. REV. 693 (1997); Jesse
Choper, The Religion Clausesofthe FirstAmendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PrIr. L. REV. 673,
680-81 (1980); John Garvey, Another Way of Looking at SchoolAid, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 61,67; Marci
Hamilton, Power, The EstablishmentClause,and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807,824-25 (1999); John

H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution,72
CALIF. L. REV. 847, 847-48 (1984); Antonin Scalia, On Getting It Wrong By Making It Look Easy, in
PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR THE EIGHTIES 173 (Edward

Gaffney, ed., 1981).
32. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 371 (5th Cir. 1998).
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decisions came from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who observed that the
Court had approved books for students in religious schools but not maps, and
inquired what the Court would do with an atlas-"a book of maps." 33 The
decisions were even treated as comic in oral argument before the Court:
QUESTION: Mr. Ball, you're not really going to try to reconcile all our
entanglement cases, are you, or anything? [General laughter.]
QUESTION: Are you going to tell us why a globe is okay, but a book
isn't and you know?
COUNSEL: The answer is that QUESTION: Senator Moynihan's question, what about a map and a
book?
COUNSEL: The answer is that I will not, Your Honor. [General
laughter.] 34

The real problem, of course, was not that the Meek-Wolman doctrine led to risible
results. It was that it prevented legislators, educators, and lower courts from
making accurate judgments about the constitutional constraints in this area. The
unpredictability and arbitrariness of the decisions interfered with the ability of
legislators to improve educational opportunities for all the children of the state.
In the years between 1980 and 2000, the Court increasingly took the view that
religious groups could share in generally available public benefits. The process
began in 1981, in Widmar v. Vincent, a nearly unanimous decision that a student
Bible study group could receive equal access to university facilities." Over the
36
next twenty years, the principle of neutrality was extended to tuition tax credits,
tuition reimbursement for disabled students for post-secondary education,37 sign
language interpreters for students at secondary schools,3" student activity funds for
a religious college magazine," 9 and remedial education for low-income students at
religiously affiliated primary and secondary schools. 4 In the last such decision,
the Court expressly repudiated the principle "that all government aid that directly

33.
34.

124 Cong. Rec. 25661 (1978).
Transcriptof Oral Argument in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., in 224 LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 521
(Kurland & Casper, eds. 1986).
35. 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
36. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
37. Witters v. Dep't of Serv., 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
38. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
39. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
40. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).

assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid,"'" which had been
the doctrinal basis for Meek and Wolman.
The rationale for these decisions is perhaps best illustrated by Witters v.
Department of Services for the Blind.42 In Witters, the state agreed to pay tuition
for blind persons for any course of post-secondary vocational study.43 Larry
Witters, who was blind, chose to apply his benefits to study to become a minister
or misionary at the Inland Empire School for Bible." It was unquestioned that
the funds paid for religious instruction and that the school itself was a deeply
religious institution.45 A unanimous Supreme Court held, however, that the
payments did not violate the Establishment Clause. Justice Marshall's opinion for
the Court identified several aspects of the program as "central to our inquiry. '
First, he noted that funding goes to the recipient institution only through the
choice of the individual student.47 "Any aid provided under Washington's
program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a result of
the genuinely independent and private choices of aid recipients."" Second, he
noted that "Washington's program is 'made available generally without regard to
the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted'
and is in no way skewed toward religion." 49 Third, Justice Marshall stressed that
the Washington program "creates no financial incentive for students to undertake
sectarian education." ' Their benefits are neither "greater nor broader" if they
"apply their aid to religious education" than if to secular programs." "[T]he fact
that aid goes to individuals means that the decision to support religious education
is made by the individual, not by the State."52 Other cases in this line of precedent
contain similar reasoning. The fundamental point is that when the government
provides benefits to individuals on a neutral basis, for secular purposes, it does not
violate the Establishment Clause when they use those benefits in a religious
setting, even though government funds are used for religious instruction.
The path of precedent is not quite as clear as may appear. First, the Court was
singularly unwilling to reconsider and overrule old precedents, even when they

41. Id. at 225.
42. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
43. ld. at 483.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. fd. at 487.
47. Id. at486-88.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 488 (quoting Comm. for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
782-83 n.38 (1973)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. In addition, Justice Marshall noted that "nothing in the record indicates that.., any significant
portion of the aid expended under the Washington program as a whole will end up flowing to religious
education." Id. Five members of the Court wrote that this factor was irrelevant, and in subsequent
decisions, it has been repudiated by the Court. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S.Ct. 2530,2542 n.6 (2000).
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had been rejected in principle. For example, even after repudiating the principle
that "that all government aid that directly assists the educational function of
religious schools is invalid," 53 which was the doctrinal holding of Meek and
Wolman, the Court refrained from explicitly overruling those decisions and issued
a warning that lower courts should continue to consider themselves bound by
earlier decisions until such time as the Supreme Court itself holds that they are no
longer good law.' Second, the trajectory toward a "neutrality" interpretation of
the Establishment Clause was interrupted in 1985 by two five-to-four decisions,
Aguilar v. Felton55 and GrandRapids School Districtv. Ball,' which returned to
the older view, in perhaps the most extreme form ever. Aguilar involved a federal
program in which public school specialists provided remedial training to needy
children on the premises of their schools, whether public or private, religious or
nonreligious. 7 Grand Rapids involved a similar state program in which public
school teachers provided remedial and enrichment courses to students in private
schools. 8 Not only were these programs neutral, but in light of their structure, the
risk that these public school teachers would engage in "religious indoctrination"
merely because they were on the premises of a religious school was so slight as
to be fanciful. Aguilar and GrandRapids were not overruled until 1997, only
after greatly confusing the doctrinal picture.
The lower courts in Mitchell therefore traversed a doctrinal landscape that
was confused, inconsistent, and in flux.5 9 They had to decide whether to follow the
logic of the Court's recent decisions or the letter of older decisions-especially
Meek and Wolman-which had not been formally overruled.' The district court
followed the logic of the recent decisions and upheld the program. 6 The Fifth
Circuit followed the older precedents and invalidated Chapter 2, while issuing its
plea to the Supreme Court to clarify the "vast, perplexing desert" of its
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.62

53. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,225 (1997).
54. Id. at 237.
55. 473 U.S. 403 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
56. 473 U.S. 373 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
57. Aguilar,473 U.S. at 402.
58. GrandRapids, 473 U.S. at 375. A separate program, also at issue in Grand Rapids,paid private
school teachers to conduct after-school classes at their own institutions. Id. at 375-76. This portion of the
case remains good law.
59. See Helms v. Cody, 1997 WL 35283 (E.D. La. 1997), and Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347 (5th
Cir. 1998), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
60. See id.
61. Cody, 1997 WL 35283 at *8-9.
62. Picard,151 F.3d at 350.

A. The Mitchell Plurality
The Court upheld the Chapter 2 program by a vote of six-to-three.63 Justices
Souter, Stevens, and Ginsburg dissented.' There was no majority opinion. A
plurality opinion, written by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, squarely adopted the view that religious
institutions are permitted to participate on a neutral basis in generally available
public programs.65 The plurality stated that "the religious nature of a recipient
should not matter to the constitutional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately
furthers the government's secular purpose."' Indeed, in a footnote, the plurality
stated that "to require exclusions of religious schools from such a program would
raise serious questions under the Free Exercise Clause."'67
Justice Thomas analyzed the case under the three criteria announced in the
recent decision, Agostini v. Felton,6" which was written by Justice O'Connor for
a five-Justice majority: (1) whether government aid to religious schools results in
governmental indoctrination; (2) whether the aid program defines its recipients by
reference to religion; and (3) whether the program leads to excessive
entanglement.69 Due to the fact that the plaintiffs did not contend that the
program led to excessive entanglement, its constitutionality turned on the first two
factors.7'
In its analysis of the first issue-governmental indoctrination-the plurality
insisted that religious indoctrination by private persons, as a result of private
choice, does not present an Establishment Clause issue. 7 Indeed, to the extent
that religious training is attributable to private choice, it is protected by the Free
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. The plurality quoted an earlier decision that
noted, "[flor a law to have forbidden 'effects'.

.

. it must be fair to say that the

government itself has advanced religion through its own activities and
influence."72 Private speech does not become attributable to the government
merely because the speaker receives the benefit of public resources. When
religious speakers use their constitutionally protected right of equal access to

63. Mitchell v Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2536 (2000).
64. Id.at 2572.
65. Id. at 2536-56.
66. Id.at 2551.
67. Id. at 2555 n. 19 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,532 (1993);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ. ofEwing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors ofUniv. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995)).
68. 521 U.S.203 (1997).
69. Id. at215-30; Mitchell, 120 S.Ct.at2537-56.
70. Mitchell, 120 S.Ct.at2537-56.
71. Id.at2541-43.
72. Id. at2541 (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.327,337 (1987) (emphasis in
original)).
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government property to deliver sermons or offer prayers, those sermons and
prayers remain constitutionally private, and do not violate the Establishment
Clause-even though, in a sense, they were "subsidized" by the government.
There was no doubt in Mitchell that the religious schools engaged in religious
teaching. (I try to avoid the Court's term "indoctrination," because it is unfairly
pejorative.) Nor was there any doubt that it would be unconstitutional for the
government to require, encourage, or direct schools to engage in religious
education. The question was whether the government became responsible for the
schools' religious teaching by virtue of its provision of computers, software, and
library books to the schools.
The plurality reasoned that the question of "governmental indoctrination"
depends on the terms under which aid is provided:
If the religious, irreligious, and areligious are all alike eligible for
governmental aid, no one would conclude that any indoctrination that
any particular recipient conducts has been done at the behest of the
government.... If the government is offering assistance to recipients
who provide, so to speak, a broad range of indoctrination, the
government itself is not thought responsible for any particular
indoctrination."
If the government assists all schools, then the government is subsidizing
education, but it is neutral toward religion.74
This is a major step toward conforming Establishment Clause jurisprudence
to the state action doctrine. As a legal and constitutional matter, religious
"indoctrination" is neither good nor bad. But it must be the product of individual
decision and not of state action. In the words of the Mitchell plurality, it is
necessary to "distinguish [I between indoctrination that is attributable to the State
and indoctrination that is not."' Although the Mitchell plurality did not expressly
cite the state action cases, this formulation of the issue-whether the challenged
action is "attributable to the State"-is precisely the same language that is found in
the state action cases.76

Prior to Mitchell, the "governmental" and "private" distinction was drawn
quite differently in cases involving the Establishment Clause than in cases

73.
74.

Id.

75.

Id.at 2541.

See id.

76. See Am. Mfr.'s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 58 (1999) ("fairly attributable to the
state").

involving other constitutional doctrines. This was particularly striking in the
context of public subsidies. In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn for example, the Court held
that actions of a private institution were not attributable to the state even though
much of the institution's budget came from public sources.77 For the conduct or
speech of a private organization to be attributed to the state, the government must
have encouraged or endorsed that conduct or speech in some specific way. Yet,
in Establishment Clause cases, it has been presumed that the religious activities
of a private organization present a constitutional problem-in other words, that
they are attributable to the state-whenever the organization has received public
funds, even if the government neither encouraged nor endorsed the religious
content. The latter understanding of state action, if taken to its logical extreme,
would subject vast aspects of private civil society to constitutional norms intended
only for the government. Given the vast network of government facilities and
resources on which society depends, the line between state and private action
would virtually collapse if the receipt of neutral assistance under neutral criteria
sufficed to make the government responsible for private action. Mitchell simply
applied the logic of Rendell-Baker to the Establishment Clause and thus
reconciled Establishment Clause doctrine and state action doctrine.
Another way to put the point is to ask whose conduct is limited by the First
Amendment. The text of the Amendment provides an answer: "Congress shall
make no law."78 After incorporation of the First Amendment through the
Fourteenth, this means "[g]overnment may make no law." It is a limitation on the
power of the government. It is not a limitation on the activities of private citizens.
Under the Establishment Clause doctrine of the Lemon era, however, litigation
focused on the activity and character of private institutions. Courts would
determine first, whether the recipient institution was "pervasively sectarian," and
second, whether it engaged in significant "religious activity." This could involve
extensive and intrusive investigation, all of it directed at private conduct-as if the
private conduct of private institutions were regulated by the Establishment Clause.
By contrast, under Mitchell, the focus of litigation is on the government.7 9 Under
what terms has the government provided funds? a' Has it treated religious and
nonreligious institutions neutrally?8' Has the government engaged in
indoctination?82 Has it created any incentives to engage in (or refrain from
engaging in) religious activity?83 If the Establishment Clause is a limitation on
government, these are the right questions. We should not be concerned about
whether private institutions are "pervasively sectarian" or whether they exercise

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

457 U.S. 830, 843 (1982).
U.S. CONST. amend I.
See Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2536.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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their constitutional right to engage in "religious activity"; we should be concerned
about whether the government has exercised power in favor of, or against,
religion.
The second Agostini criterion-whether the recipients of the aid are defined by
reference to religion-was easily answered.'
Chapter 2 aid is provided to all
students on a per capita basis, without regard for the religious or nonreligious,
public or private character of their schools.8 5 This means that families choosing
what kind of education to obtain for their children will not be influenced by
unequal subsidies by the government (insofar as Chapter 2 is concerned;
obviously, the availability of a free public education will continue to be a powerful
disincentive to choose nonpublic schools). This is as it should be. The state has
a strong and legitimate interest in ensuring that children obtain a high-quality
education, but it has no legitimate interest in whether that education contains a
religious component. The religious or nonreligious character of education is a
matter that the First Amendment consigns to private judgment.
Some may argue, as a matter of legislative policy, that the government has a
legitimate interest in favoring public over private education, perhaps because of
the democratic value of common schools.86 That would be a rationale for
confining public subsidies to public schools. It would not, however, justify
exclusion only of religious private schools. Once the legislative decision has been
made to assist children attending nonpublic schools, the First Amendment,
properly understood, should forbid-not require-discrimination against nonpublic
schools on the basis of their philosophy, ideology, or religion.
The plurality was less than clear about the relation between the first and
second Agostini criteria. According to the plurality, the second criterion "looks
to the same set of facts as does our focus under the first criterion," but "the second
criterion uses those facts to answer a somewhat different question-whether the
criteria for allocating the aid 'creat[e] a financial incentive to undertake religious
indoctrination.""'87 I think this understates the difference. Far from being
redundant, the two criteria reflect two separate strands of Establishment Clause
doctrine. The first criterion is concerned with whether the religious instruction
is fairly attributable to the government. That relates to the state action issue. This
strand of Establishment Clause doctrine is an institutional guarantee against
official religious orthodoxy. As Madison argued in his Memorial and

84.
85.
86.

See id. at 2552.
Id.
I consider these arguments in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, EDUCATION DISESTABLISHMENT: WHY

DEMOCRATIC VALUES ARE ILL-SERVED BY DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OVER SCHOOLING, XX NOMOS

(forthcoming).
87.

Mitchell, 120 S.Ct. at 2543 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997)).

Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, "the Civil Magistrate is [not] a
competent Judge of Religious Truth."88 The First Amendment does not attempt
to establish any particular balance between religious and secular influences in
society; religion is permitted to "flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and
the appeal of its dogma."'89 But the First Amendment does stand for the proposition
that religious influences must emanate from private sources and not from the
government. Thus, to the extent that religious teaching is to be a part of the
education of young Americans, this must be the product of decisions made by
individual families and religious societies and not of government direction. The
first Agostini criterion is a safeguard against that.
The second criterion is concerned with whether the program creates any
"financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination."' This relates to the
fundamental First Amendment value of ensuring that private individuals and
groups are free to make religiously significant judgments on the basis of their own
conscience and convictions, without governmental impediment. This is a
guarantee of individual religious liberty. The government may not use its
power-including its fiscal power-to create incentives or disincentives to practice
religion, to favor one religion over another, or to favor religion over the
alternatives. The second criterion thus reflects this nation's historic commitment
to "full and equal" rights of conscience. 9' Together, these two principles reflect the
institutional and individual rights strands of the Establishment Clause.
Under the plurality's interpretation, a favorable conclusion under these two
criteria was sufficient to establish the program's constitutionality. 92 There was no
need to determine whether the religious school used the educational materials for
strictly secular purposes, because the Establishment Clause does not limit the right
of private institutions to engage in religious teaching, even with the benefit of
neutrally available public resources.93 Indeed, as if to underscore the point, the
plurality expressly agreed with the dissenters that there were documented
instances in which Chapter 2 materials had been "diverted" to religious
instruction. 4 This did not, however, affect the plurality's legal analysis, because
the constitutionality of a government program is determined by the government's
actions, not by the actions of private parties. If the government provides roads for
everyone, it does not violate the Establishment Clause if some people use those
roads to travel to church.

88. James Madison, Memorial and RemonstranceAgainst Religious Assessments, reprinted in 5
PHILIP KURLAND & RALPH LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTrrurION, 83 (1987).
89. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
90. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2543.
91. See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and HistoricalMeaning of FreeExercise of Religion,
103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1481-82 (1990) (discussing early draft ofthe First Amendment, written by James
Madison, that protected the "full and equal rights of conscience").
92. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2555.
93. Id. at 2547, 2553-54.
94. Id. at 2554.
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B. The O'Connor Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, took a
somewhat different view.95 According to these Justices, the Establishment Clause
is offended when public resources provided directly to a religious institution are
used for religious purposes.' They adjudged the Chapter 2 safeguards, however,
to be reasonably effective and any violations to be insubstantial. Accordingly, they
voted with the plurality to uphold the program. 97 Because it reflects the narrowest
basis for the decision, the O'Connor-Breyer concurring opinion presumably will
be treated as controlling in lower court litigation,9" and therefore warrants full
discussion.
The O'Connor-Breyer position departed from the plurality's in two respects.
First, the concurring Justices disagreed with the plurality's "rule" that
"government aid to religious schools does not have the effect of advancing religion
so long as the aid is offered on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content."'
Second, they disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that "actual diversion" of
public funds to religious instruction is of no constitutional significance in cases of
direct (albeit neutral) programs.100
Even so, the concurring Justices were far closer to the plurality than to the
dissent, and far more accommodating to government assistance to religious
institutions than the Lemon-era precedents on which the dissenters relied. First,
even though it is not dispositive, the concurring Justices continued to treat the
neutrality of the program as "important"'0 ' and endorsed the holdings of past cases
that take "a more forgiving view of neutral government programs that make aid
available generally without regard to the religious or nonreligious character of the
recipient school."'0 2 In a variety of contexts, Justice O'Connor has expressed

95. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Id. (O'Connor J., concurring).
98. This may not be certain. Because seven of the Justices came to the conclusion that Chapter 2
materials had actually been diverted to religious instruction, it is odd to say that the concurring opinion,
which takes the position that actual diversion is a constitutional violation, reflects the "holding" of the case.
See id. The actual "holding" is some combination of the view that the program need only be "neutral" and
the view that a program is unconstitutional only if there is substantial evidence of actual diversion. See id.
Obviously, this is a doctrinally unstable position, and we can expect further development in future cases.
99. Id. at 2556 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 2558 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 2557 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 2562 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481 (1986); Agnosti v. Felton, 522 U.S. 803 (1997); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S.
1 (1993)).

reluctance to treat any one factor, such as neutrality, as dispositive. 3
Nonetheless, in every case involving a neutral program, she has come to the
conclusion that it is constitutional." ° For example, in the context of private
religious speech on government property, she has declined to endorse Justice
Scalia's categorical position that there is no Establishment Clause problem when
the speech is permitted on neutral terms, insisting on a fact-sensitive investigation
into the issue of government "endorsement"; but in every such case she has found
that private religious speech in a neutral public forilm satisfies this test."°5 The
difference here seems to be jurisprudential rather than substantive: the plurality,
led by Justices Scalia and Thomas, have a preference for crisp, seemingly
objective, "rule-like," constitutional doctrine, while Justice O'Connor prefers more
contextual, "standard-like" approaches. "0Their underlying visions of freedom of
religion are not that different.
Unlike the plurality, the concurring Justices maintained that different
constitutional rules apply to school aid programs, depending on whether the funds
pass through the hands of the individual students or are paid directly to the
institution. 17 Let us look at both of these contexts.
1. "True private-choice programs"
Perhaps the most striking feature of the concurring opinion was its agreement
with the plurality regarding the constitutionality of what they called "true privatechoice programs," without the need for secular use restrictions.' 8 These are
programs, like vouchers, in which "the aid was provided directly to the individual
student who, in turn, made the choice of where to put that aid to use."'" A prime
example is Witters." When aid is provided to individual beneficiaries on a
neutral basis, for secular purposes, the Establishment Clause does not bar them
from choosing to use their benefits in a religious setting, even if doing so involves
indirect public funding of religious instruction."' This may be the most
significant aspect of the entire Mitchell litigation: on the extremely important

103. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 847-48 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Capital Square Review & Advisory Comm'n v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,718-19 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
104. Id.
105. Capital Square, 515 U.S. at 774-78; see also Bd. of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v.
Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) (O'Connor, J.); supra note 102.
106. See generally Kathleen Sullivan, Foreword:The Justices of Rules and Standards,106 HARV.
L. REV.22 (1992).
107. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2559 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 2558 (O'Connor J., concurring).
110. Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 481 (1986).
111. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2530.
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question of educational vouchers, which might reach the Court next Term,"
Justices O'Connor and Breyer will likely vote to sustain their constitutionality.
Notwithstanding the recent decision of the Sixth Circuit," 3 a properly designed
voucher plan, which is genuinely neutral and provides an array of educational
alternatives, is almost certainly constitutional.
The only significant difference between the concurring opinion and the
plurality is over the treatment of aid programs in which the allocation criteria are
neutral and objective, but where ihe aid is dispensed directly to the institution
rather than passing through the hands of individual beneficiaries." 4 The plurality
maintained that it is "formalistic" to insist that the funds actually pass through the
hands of the individual students." 5 "Although the presence of private choice is
easier to see when aid literally passes through the hands of individuals," the
plurality explained, "there is no reason why the Establishment Clause requires
such a form."" 6 That position seems likely to carry the day. In most contexts, the
choice of mechanism makes no difference to any matter of substance, and it would
be strange to maintain a constitutional distinction based on so insubstantial a

difference. In Witters v. Departmentof Services, for example, the Court assumed

that the state transmitted funds to the student and the student transmitted funds to
the college.' In fact, however, an amicus party investigated and found that the
check went directly from the state to the college."' It is hard to see what
.difference it makes. The constitutional principle at stake has to do with
governmental favoritism and turns on whether the allocation of funds is
determined by governmental discretion or private choice. "True private-choice
programs" are examples of programs in which governmental discretion is
eliminated, but they are not the only such programs.
The concurring opinion offered three reasons for maintaining the distinction:
first, the fact that the money flows through private hands guarantees that "the
advancement of religion is therefore wholly dependent on the student's private
decision"; second, the indirect character of the aid vitiates any appearance of
endorsement; and third, the distinction is especially important in the case of

112. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000); cf Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d
602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
113. Simmons-Harris,243 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000).
114. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2530.
115. Id. at 2546.
116. Id. at 2545.
117. 474U.S. 481 (1986).
118. BriefofAmicus Curiae Anti-Defamation League at appendix, Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Serv. for
the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (No. 84-1070).

"direct monetary subsidies.... 9 These arguments are not persuasive. As noted
above, the voucher mechanism is not the only way to ensure that the allocation of
funds is wholly dependent on the student's private decision. In Witters, for
example, the student controlled the funds-whether the check was addressed to him
or addressed to the school. 2° The question of endorsement is one of appearance,
and I am skeptical that most "reasonable observers" would perceive any difference.
(Direct grants have long been made to religiously affiliated colleges and social
welfare agencies, without apparently raising any eyebrows.) The difference
between cash and in-kind aid is questionable for reasons discussed below. 2 ' On
the other side of the ledger, adherence to the direct/indirect line can lead to
discriminatory and unfair consequences, for no apparent purpose.
For example, in Columbia Union College v. Oliver, now before the Fourth
Circuit for the second time, a fully-accredited Seventh-Day Adventist educational
institution with an impeccable academic record was denied a per capita
educational subsidy because it was "pervasively sectarian," while several Roman
Catholic Colleges in the state were given funds.'22 This would appear to be a
violation of the College's rights of free speech and free exercise, because the sole
basis for denying funds was the religious viewpoint of the institution.' 23 But
because the form of the aid was "direct" (the state transferred funds directly to the
institution, rather than to students), the Fourth Circuit held that the college could
be excluded if it were "pervasively sectarian."' 24 Looking at each of Justice
O'Connor's rationales, none seems applicable in this context. There is no doubt
that the allocation of state funds is "wholly dependent on the student's private
decisions,"' 25 because state officials have no discretion whatever to deviate from
a per capita payment. As to worries about "endorsement," grants under this
program have been made to Catholic colleges (deemed not to be "pervasively
sectarian") in the state for a quarter of a century, without apparent
misunderstanding. One could argue that the differential treatment of Catholic and
Seventh-Day Adventist colleges raises more serious "endorsement" and
"disparagement" concerns than treating all alike. It is also late in the day to worry
about "monetary grants," because the constitutionality of such "monetary grants"
was approved by the Court as long ago as 1976.26
Another example of the perverse direct/indirect distinction is Fordhanm

concurring).
119. Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2559-60 (O'Connor, J.,
120.
Witters, 474 U.S. at 481.
121. See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13644, at *4 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2000),
122.
__
). The original case before the Fourth Circuit was
appeal docketed, No. 00-2193 (4th Cir.
Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
123. The analogy to Rosenbergerv. Rector& Visitors of the University of Virginia seems indisputable.
See Rosenburger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
124. Columbia Union Coll., 159 F.3d at 162-63.
125.
Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2559 (2000) (emphasis in original).
126. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
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University v. Brown.127 In that case, the Department of Commerce awarded
construction grants to public radio stations for improved telecommunications
facilities, based on technical criteria having nothing to do with religion."2 The
technical selection team recommended Fordham University, a Jesuit institution,
for the award, but was overruled on the ground that Fordham carries a weekly
broadcast of the Catholic mass for the benefit of shut-ins.19 The university
argued, quite persuasively, that this was a classic unconstitutional condition and
a violation of its freedom of speech. 3 ° But relying on the direct/indirect
distinction, the district court held that it would be unconstitutional to provide the
grant.'3

On appeal, the Department of Justice chose not to defend the decision,

and the case was settled in Fordham's favor. Again, applying Justice O'Connor's
three rationales, it is hard to see why the direct character of this form of aid should
make any difference to the outcome. Denying a radio station construction funds
because of a single weekly program is like denying a public radio station general
subsidies because of its editorials-a
restriction held unconstitutional in FCC v.
32
League of Women Voters.

Other.specific cases might present different issues. We cannot discount the
possibility that there maybe contexts in which the direct/indirect distinction serves
constitutional purposes. One can respect the caution of the concurring Justices on
this issue. But it seems likely that the plurality is correct that this is a
"formalistic" distinction that should eventually be discarded, at least in its
generalized form.
2. Direct-aid programs
Even in the case of direct aid, where public assistance is provided directly to
the religious school rather than passing through the hands of the student in the
form of a voucher, the concurring Justices made a major step beyond older
precedent.'33 Under older precedent, if a recipient institution is "pervasively
sectarian," then it is presumed that most forms of aid to its educational mission are
unconstitutional. According to Lemon v. Kurtzman, the leading case from this era,
the state had to be "certain" that its aid would not be used for religious purpose,
and efforts to monitor the possibility of religious uses were generally deemed to

127.

856 F. Supp. 684 (D. D.C. 1994).

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 688.
Id.at 689.
Id. at 689-704.
Id. at 705.
468 U.S. 364 (1984).

133.

See Mitchell v. Helm, 120 S. Ct. 2530, 2259-71 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

699

'
constitute excessive "entanglement."134
This was the famous "Catch-22"' 35 that
made aid to "pervasively sectarian" institutions unconstitutional whenever it was
applied with any degree of rigor. (Some aid slipped by, but only because a
temporary majority of the Court was willing either to relax the "certainty"
standard or to tolerate a reasonable amount of "entanglement."' 36 ) By contrast,
religiously affiliated but not "pervasively sectarian" institutions, such as most
religious colleges and universities, were presumed capable of complying with
secular use restrictions, and thus could receive aid. There was no requirement of
"certainty," and routine safeguards against religious uses, similar to those
applicable to other grant conditions, were treated as constitutionally adequate and
tolerable. "' The effect was to apply different constitutional principles to different
religious institutions, seemingly on the basis of the intensity of their religiosity.
The concurring Justices in Mitchell rejected that bifurcated approach.' 38 They
did not employ the analytical category of "pervasively sectarian" institutions that
had been criticized by the plurality for its arbitrariness and its connection to
nineteenth century anti-Catholic bigotry. 39 They substituted a unified test in
which neutral government aid to religiously affiliated institutions (whether
"pervasively sectarian" or not) is unconstitutional only if the plaintiffs "prove that
the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious purposes."'" In
making that judgment, they reversed the legal presumption. 4 ' Instead of
assuming that "pervasively sectarian" institutions are incapable of complying with
secular use restrictions, the concurring Justices averred that "it is entirely proper
to presume that these school officials will act in good faith."' 42 They placed the
burden on the plaintiffs to demonstrate the contrary. "' Moreover, they repudiated
the premise that "the government must have a fail-safe mechanism capable of

134. 403U.S.602,619(1971).
135. This was the description given to the combination of the "effects" and "entanglement" prongs by
the Court in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615 (1988).
136. See, e.g., Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236-44 (1997) (textbooks, testing and scoring, and diagnostic services), overruled
on other grounds by Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000).
137. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Roemer v. Bd.
of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). Interestingly, this distinction between "pervasively sectarian" and
merely "religiously affiliated" institutions was rejected by a majority of the Justices even at its inception.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,667-68 (White, J., concurring in an opinion also applying to Tilton)
(arguing that all aid to religious schools-colleges and well as elementary and secondary schools-should be
subject to the same constitutional standard, and that the aid was constitutional); id.at 659-661 (Brennan,
J., dissenting, in an opinion also applying to Tilton) (arguing that all aid to religious schools should be
subject to the same constitutional standard and that the aid was unconstitutional).
138. See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 2259-71 (2000) (O'Connor J., concurring).
139. Id. at 2551-52.
140. Id. at 2567 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2570 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor noted that courts must "assume that
religious-school instructorscan abide by [secular use] restrictions". Id. at 2568 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
143. See id.

[Vol. 28: 681, 2001]

Establishmentand Private Religious Expression
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

detecting any instance of diversion."'" While "any use of public funds to promote
religious doctrines violates the Establishment Clause" in theory, only "extensive
violations" would justify the remedy of holding an entire program
unconstitutional. 145
This combination of doctrinal adjustments makes religiously affiliated
elementary and secondary schools eligible for in-kind public aid on the same
constitutional basis as religious colleges and universities for the first time since
1971. Moreover, given the practicalities of litigation, the change wrought by the
Mitchell concurrence is even more significant than it may at first appear.
Although each doctrinal adjustment involved merely a question, of degree or
change in presumption, rather than a change in the substantive prohibitions of the
Establishment Clause, the effect is to make Establishment Clause challenges to
school aid programs expensive to litigate and difficult to win. Under the older
cases, religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools were presumed
unable or unwilling to comply with secular use restrictions, making most forms
of aid unconstitutional. Plaintiffs could bring facial challenges to entire programs
even before they were put into effect, and litigation could be resolved on a motion
for summary judgment, without need for elaborate discovery or fact-finding.
Under the Mitchell concurring opinion, the government will be able to provide
secular, neutral, and nonideological materials and equipment, and the burden will
be on opponents of the program to show actual diversion." That will require "as
applied" challenges, with extensive, and expensive, discovery. As Mitchell
illustrates, it will not be easy for plaintiffs to prove actual diversion, and even if
they do, the result will only be to require modifications in the particular program
where violations are found.' 47 Only in the rare case, when the plaintiff documents
"extensive" violations, will courts order relief in the form of invalidation of entire
programs. '

There is one potentially important caveat. The concurring Justices suggested,
in dictum, that "direct monetary aid" to religious institutions may be subject to
special limitations, beyond the prohibition of "diversion" to religious uses, because
"special dangers" are "associated with direct money grants to religious
institutions."' 4 9 They do not state precisely what these limitations would be.
Would accounting controls, similar to those used to ensure that public money is

144. Id. at 2569 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
145. Id. at 2571 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 623 (1988))
(emphasis in original).
146. See id. at 2567-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
147. See id. at 2570-71 (O'Connor J., concurring).
148. See id. at 2571 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
149. Id. at 2566 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

not used for partisan political purposes, be sufficient?" S° Such controls have long
been treated as constitutionally sufficient in the case of public funding of
religiously affiliated social service organizations, health care institutions, and
colleges.'51 Or is there a categorical prohibition on money grants to religious
schools? None of this is made clear. At least for the time being, however,
legislators would be well-advised to structure direct aid programs in the form of
in-kind transfers rather than money grants.
It is difficult to fathom the rationale for this distinction. Money grants and
in-kind aid are almost identical in their objective effects. There is no apparent
constitutional distinction between providing the money for a school to purchase
a computer and purchasing a computer for the school. The effect on the taxpayer
is the same, and the effect on the students is the same. Notably, the cases
involving aid to religious colleges and universities, on which the concurring
Justices relied, all involved direct monetary grants, and the Court never suggested
that there was any special constitutional issue in those instances.' 52 The only
practical difference is that an institution could conceivably use a money grant for
a purpose other than that specified by the government. But it is standard practice
to provide money grants to private grantees to be used for specific purposes, and
if it were not possible to enforce such conditions by routine auditing, the entire
premise of federal and state grantmaking would be undermined. Indeed, it would
seem to be easier-not more difficult-to enforce restrictions of this sort than to
enforce the secular use requirements the concurring opinion is willing to
countenance. ( If the state grants $2,000 to a school to purchase a computer, it is
easier for the auditors to check whether the school has spent $2,000 on a computer
than to determine whether the computer was used for any religious purposes.)
Because the concurring Justices are willing to "presume that these school officials
will act in good faith" with regard to secular use requirements,'53 it would be
bizarre to assume that they will not comply with straightforward, routine, and
objective requirements regarding what will be purchased with public funds, or that
the government will be unable to enforce them.
The only explanation provided by the concurring opinion for its special
treatment of monetary grants is that "this form of aid falls precariously close to
the original object of the Establishment Clause's prohibition."'" This rationale
is entirely unconvincing. The "original object of the Establishment Clause's
prohibition" was direct payments to churches, on a selective basis, for the

150. See Michael W. McConnell, Political and ReligiousDisestablishment,1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 405,
456-59 (1986).
151. Id.
152. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2566-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672 (1971)).
153. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
154. See Mitchell, 120 S. Ct. at 2566 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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propagation of religious doctrine.155 Aid of this sort would be unconstitutional
whether in cash or in any other form. The reason aid to religious schools is
distinguishable is that it is provided to all schools on a neutral basis, without
regard to their religious or nonreligious character, for the secular purpose of
promoting education. If that explanation is persuasive, there is no reason it should
not apply to cash as well as to in-kind benefits.
Thus, the new legal landscape looks like this: A school aid program is
constitutional if structured as a "true private-choice program," in which the funds
are provided directly to an individual who then makes the choice of where to put
the aid to use, even if the funds are ultimately used, in part, for religious activities
or religious instruction. If a state provides aid directly to a religiously affiliated
institution, neutrality is necessary, but not sufficient: aid may not be used for
religious purposes, and if the plaintiff can show extensive violations of this secular
use requirement, the entire program can be invalidated. Moreover, there are
additional, but as yet unspecified, restrictions on direct monetary grants to
religious schools, at least at the elementary and secondary level.
II. SANTA FE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT V. DOE
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, popularly known as the
"football prayer case," explored the boundary between two different lines of
precedent regarding religious expression in public settings.'56 In one line of
decisions, beginning with the School PrayerCase of the early 1960's, involving
classroom prayer,'57 and culminating in Lee v. Weisman in 1992, involving prayers
by an invited clergyman at a graduation ceremony,158 the Supreme Court held that
public schools could not include prayers or comparable religious affirmations as
part of official school functions-whether or not students or other attendees were
compelled to participate. In a second line of decisions, beginning with Widmar v.
Vincent in 1980,' and culminating in Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens in 1990"° and Capitol Square Review and
Advisory Board v. Pinette in 1995,161 the Court held that private speakers have the
right to engage in religious speech (including prayer) on public property on the
same terms as speakers who wish to engage in secular speech. The question in
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Santa Fe was how to characterize a public school policy that allowed the student
body to elect a spokesperson who was then permitted to deliver "a brief invocation
and/or message" of his or her choice at the beginning of varsity football games.'62
When prayers were delivered pursuant to this policy, were they attributable to the
school district (hence unconstitutional)? Or were they an example of private
speech in an open speech forum created by the school district (hence
constitutional)?
This is essentially the same issue that underlay Mitchell v. Helms. In both
cases, there was religious speech by private parties, assisted or made possible by
government resources. In Mitchell, the private speech of religious schools was
assisted by the loan of educational materials and equipment under Chapter 2.63
In Santa Fe, the private speech of students was assisted by giving them bully
pulpit of the public loudspeaker before the start of varsity football games. 6" In
both cases, there were various ways in which the problem might be analyzed,
depending on the underlying rationale of the Establishment Clause. For example,
if the underlying rationale is to protect members of the public from being forced
to provide material support to religious activity, even on a neutral basis, then both
Chapter 2 and the pre-football "invocation or message" policy should be seen as
unconstitutional (along with all other forms of aid to religious education and the
use of public forums by religious speakers). If the underlying rationale is to
preserve the "wall of separation" between church and state by ensuring that
activities that are carried out in the public sphere are strictly secular, then both
policies should be seen an unconstitutional. Public programs like Chapter 2
should not include religious institutions, and public school activities, like football
games, must not have religious elements. If the underlying rationale is to prevent
coercion of unwilling audiences to hear religious messages, then Chapter 2 might
be constitutional (attendance at religious schools is by choice only), while the
constitutionality of the football "invocation or message" policy would hinge on
whether the audience at a football game is "captive," rather than on whether the
school district is responsible for the decision to deliver a prayer. In fact, the Court
in both cases rejected these approaches and decided on the basis of whether the
religious activity was properly attributable to the state.
The procedural posture of the Santa Fe case was complicated and unusual,
making proper resolution of the constitutional issue more difficult. When the
litigation commenced in 1995, the school district, like others in that part of Texas,
had a practice of permitting the student council chaplain (a student) to deliver a
prayer over the public address system at the beginning of varsity football games. 6 '
Apparently realizing that this policy was constitutionally untenable, the school
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district adopted a different policy while the litigation was proceeding, only to
replace that policy with a third a few months later."6 The final policy was the
subject of a "facial challenge" brought before the policy was put into effect.167
The policy in question provided:
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation
and/or message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home
varsity football games to solemnize the event, to promote good
sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the appropriate
environment for the competition.
Upon advice and direction of the high school principal, each spring, the
high school student council shall conduct an election, by the high school
student body, by secret ballot to determine whether such a message or
invocation will be a part of the pre-game ceremonies and if so, shall elect
a student, from a list of student volunteers, to deliver the statement or
invocation. The student volunteer who is selected by his or her
classmates may decide what statement and/or invocation to deliver,
consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy."6
A six-Justice majority, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, affirmed a lower
court decision that this policy was unconstitutional on its face.' 69 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented. 70 They would have
rejected the facial challenge to the policy, while leaving the possibility of an "as
applied" challenge to be adjudicated on the basis of a factual record.'
A. The State of Lower Court Precedent
The school district's attempts to devise a constitutional policy for its pre-game
ceremonies were greatly complicated by the incoherent state of precedent in the
Fifth Circuit where it was located. In the wake of Lee v. Weisman, different panels
of the Fifth Circuit adopted different interpretations that, in tandem, produced
rules for prayer in public school settings that have little relation to any
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constitutional value.'72 In Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,a
panel held that student-led prayer that was approved by a vote of the students and
was nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in content would be permissible at
graduation ceremonies.'73 That was a dubious interpretation of Lee. While the
vote of the student body may insulate the school district, to some extent, from
responsibility for the decision, in my opinion this does not solve the "state action"
problem. There is little precedent on point, but actions of the student government
more closely resemble "state" than "private" action. Indeed, from the point of
view of the students themselves, the student government is a government.
Moreover, this policy drew no support from the idea of limited public forums for
speech, because the policy allowed only one choice of message: prayer. This was
neutral in neither a free speech nor an Establishment Clause sense. The attempt
to limit the content of the prayers-whatever a "nonsectarian" and
"nonproselytizing" prayer might mean-made matters worse. This forced the
school district to engage in censorship pursuant to criteria that seem inherently
discriminatory among religious viewpoints.
A second panel of the Fifth Circuit responded with Doe v. Duncanville
IndependentSchool District.'" Evidently disagreeing with the logic of Jones but
unable to overrule it, this panel drew a constitutional distinction between
graduation ceremonies, in which prayers would be permitted under the Jones
standards, and all other school functions (including football games), at which
prayers would be forbidden no matter what the terms of the policy might be."'
This distinction between the type of school event has no apparent connection to
any constitutional principle, and the combination of the decisions was bound to
mislead school boards attempting to comply with the law. These decisions made
the cases turn on where the prayers were to be delivered, their theological
perspective, and whether they were supported by a majority of the students. Thus,
at the time the Supreme Court was asked to review the decision, there was genuine
need for clarification of the rules.
B. The Majority Opinion
The principal section of the Court's opinion was devoted to an examination
of the policy, beginning with its text, and extending to "factors beyond just the text
of the policy,"' 76 including the historical background, the manner of conducting
the student election, the social context, and the perceptions of the students.'77 The
Court concluded that the delivery of religious messages "over the school's public
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address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision
of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly
encourages public prayer-is not properly characterized as 'private' speech." '78
In this section of the opinion, the Court made no sweeping pronouncements
barring religious speech from public settings. In marked contrast to the lower
court, the Supreme Court engaged in a careful, context-sensitive analysis of why,
under the circumstances of this case, the school district's argument that the
football game prayers were "private speech" should not be accepted. 79 It began
by affirming the basic dichotomy between government and private speech,
endorsing the statement in an earlier case that "there is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect."'" The Court observed that "not every message" that is
"authorized by a government policy and take[s] place on government property at
government-sponsored school- related events" is attributable to the government. ''
Far from "bristl[ing] with hostility to all things religious in public life," as Chief
Justice Rehnquist charged in dissent,'82 this statement affirms the legitimacy of at
least some forms of religious expression on public property, even when officially
"authorized."
This is a significant point, because genuinely private student religious
expression on school property has frequently been challenged by plaintiffs in court,
and often forbidden by school officials. One of the most important free speech
controversies of the early 1980s was over whether student Bible clubs could meet
after school in public school classrooms. Every court of appeals to address the
question held that this would violate the Establishment Clause, until Congress
passed the Equal Access Act in 1984.83 Even then, separationist groups and
school boards challenged the Act, and the Ninth Circuit held it unconstitutional. "
8
Now-a decade after the Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality"'
-the Equal
Access Act is viewed, even by many who opposed it at the time, as a triumph for
civil liberties of high school students. That was only one of many conflicts about
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private religious speech in the public school context. In other cases, students have
been disciplined for distributing religious literature at school (even where other
literature would be permitted);'86 class valedictorians have been barred from
delivering addresses at graduation that contain religious expression;... and
students have been prevented from writing on religious-and only religious-topics
out of a mistaken fear of violating church-state separation.'88 These examples
illustrate why the Santa Fe majority recognized that the mere fact that private
religious speech is authorized by the government and takes place on government
property before public audiences does not constitute an establishment of religion.
The Court then proceeded to identify a number of specific facts regarding the
text and context of the policy that make it reasonable to attribute football game
prayers at Santa Fe Independent School District to the state. 8 9 This analysis
focused on two key questions: (1) whether the criteria by which speakers are
selected were genuinely secular and neutral toward religion, and (2) whether the
government exercised control or influence over the content of their messages.19°
This accorded with the approach taken by a quite different majority in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.'9' There, the
Court explained that the Establishment Clause applies to religious messages when
"the State is the speaker" either because it "enlists private entities to convey its
own message" or "determines... [its] content."' 92 The Santa Fe Court concluded
both that the school district effectively "enlisted" the speakers for the purpose of
conveying its chosen message and that the school officials regulated the content
of the message. 193
First, regarding the identity of the speaker, the Court pointed out that in
contrast to a typical free speech forum, under the policy only one student was
allowed to speak-the same student for the entire year. " The Court properly noted
that, in and of itself, this would not be constitutionally decisive. 9 In this case,
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however, the single speaker was chosen by majority vote of the student body."9
As the Court noted, "the majoritarian process implemented by the District
guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never prevail and that their
views will be effectively silenced." 97 To make matters worse, the school district
did not consider it necessary to conduct a new election for speaker under the new
policy-leaving in place the results under a prior policy, which expressly
contemplated a prayer.' 98 That rendered it almost certain that the speaker was a
person willing to make a prayer his message.
Second, regarding the content of the message, the Santa Fe Court noted that
the "statement or invocation... is subject to particular regulations that confine the
content and topic of the student's message."'" The language of the policy singles
out "invocations" as the only type of message specifically mentioned." ° Moreover,
the purpose of the message-to "solemnize the event"-narrows the permissible
range of topics."0' The Court concluded that this choice of language "invites and
encourages religious messages," because "[a] religious message is the most
obvious method of solemnizing an event. '"2' Moreover, because these terms are
not self-defining, the school administration will presumably exercise some degree
of discretionary control over the content of the messages, in order to ensure that
they are within the scope of the policy. That detracts from the claim that the
messages are purely attributable to the student speaker.
The Court supplemented this analysis of the school's involvement with
speaker selection and the content of the message with observations regarding the
social context in which the message would be delivered, the perceptions of the
audience, and the history of the development of the policy. 3 This led the Court
to conclude that there was a significant danger that the messages would be
understood as having official sanction, that this was in fact the perception, and
that the purpose of the policy was to continue the prior practice of prayers before
football games."
I do not have any disagreement with the general proposition that a
policy-even if neutral on its face-can be held to be a violation of the First
Amendment when the totality of the circumstances demonstrate an
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unconstitutional purpose and effect. If officially sanctioned prayers at public
events are unconstitutional, government bodies cannot evade constitutional
limitations by clever stratagems. Nor do I have any serious disagreement with the
Court's conclusions, based on this record, that the Santa Fe policy had the purpose
and effect of perpetuating its prior practice of beginning football games with
prayer. It is difficult to believe this was a neutral forum for student speech. In the
social context of this part of Texas, where football prayer is an established custom,
it would be hard to say the Court's conclusions were unreasonable. Indeed,
because there is no known custom of student messages at the beginning of football
games-other than prayers-in this part of Texas (or elsewhere to my knowledge),
the Court's conclusions were more than reasonable.
More importantly, the Court's general approach to the Establishment Clause
issue was correct. The Court expressed its conclusions in careful terms, avoiding
sweeping or overbroad statements that might interfere with legitimate private
religious speech. The Court based its decision on a fact-specific investigation of
whether the decision to conduct prayers at football games is properly attributed to
the school board or to individual speakers chosen on neutral grounds. 25
Doctrinally, the importance of the decision does not depend on whether the Court
was correct to conclude that the Santa Fe School District's policy was on one side
of the line or the other but on whether the constitutional line is drawn on the basis
of proper constitutional principles.
C. The Problem With The Facial Challenge
There was, however, a serious technical problem with the Santa Fe decision:
the plaintiffs challenged the Santa Fe policy on its face." ° A facial challenge is
one based solely on the challenged enactment itself, "without the benefit of a
record as to how the statute had actually been applied."2 7 In a facial challenge,
the court must examine the challenged policy on its own terms, divorced from the
particular "circumstances" 2" and without regard to "the manner in which it had
been administered in practice."2 °' As the Court observed in United States v.
Salerno, a facial challenge is "the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid."21° The reason is that when a particular policy is held
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unconstitutional on its face, this constitutes a ruling that such a policy would be
unconstitutional anywhere, under any circumstances. Typically, a facial challenge
is brought without extensive discovery or a detailed factual record, because facts
other than the nature of the policy itself are not relevant.
The plaintiffs in Santa Fe had to bring the case as a facial challenge because
the new policy had not been implemented, and thus there could be no factual
record about its implementation.2 ' Accordingly, any discussion of its actual
effects, including what speakers would be elected, what messages they would
deliver, and what the perceptions of the students would be, was speculative. Such
speculation is not inappropriate in an "as applied" challenge, when the totality of
the circumstances may be taken into account, and the court is free to draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence. But in a facial challenge, the court does
not have a full factual record, and the decision is supposed to be based not on the
surrounding circumstances, but on the policy itself. This was no small matter in
the Santa Fe litigation, because the principal arguments offered by the defendant
school board in Santa Fe had to do with the facial nature of the challenge and the
need for a remand to allow factfinding on the basis of an actual record." 2
Stripped of presuppositions based on the social context of the case, the Santa
Fe policy is not obviously unconstitutional. The policy has two parts. As the
Court explained: 'The decision whether to deliver a message is first made by
majority vote of the entire student body, followed by a choice of the speaker in a
separate, similarly majority election."2 3 Neither of these decisions is necessarily
about prayer. As the Court noted, "the particular words used by the speaker are
not determined by those votes."2"4 Without more information about the social
context and the implementation of the policy, it is far from clear that any First
Amendment violation would occur. The students might not vote to have a pregame speech; they might elect a speaker according to wholly secular criteria, such
as popularity or speaking ability; the speaker might choose not to offer prayers;
and even if the speaker offered prayers, it might be done in a context that made
clear the private nature of the speech.
It is difficult to square the Court's analysis of the Santa Fe case to the
strictures of a facial challenge. The Court acknowledged that its "examination.
. [did] not stop at an analysis of the text of the policy."2 5 Indeed, the very
reason the Court explored the social context and historical experience surrounding
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this case was that it was necessary to the conclusion that the district's formally
neutral policy was in fact skewed toward prayer.2"6 The Court expressly relied on
such extrinsic information as the failure of the school principal to conduct a new
election after adoption of a new policy, the language used by the district in
connection with past policies, and factual inferences about social pressure and
student perceptions." 7 "We refuse to turn a blind eye to the context in which this
policy arose," the Court said, "and that context quells any doubt that this policy
was implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer."2"8 But the very
idea of a facial challenge is that the policy is unconstitutional in all conceivable
applications. If it is necessary to consult "the context" in order to "quell doubts,"
then it is not a proper facial challenge.
The Court could have dealt with this problem in one of several ways. First,
it could have set forth an explanation of the operative legal principles and
remanded the case to the trial court for factual findings and an ultimate decision.
Second, it could have confined its analysis to the bare text of the policy. It is quite
possible that such an analysis would have led the Court to reverse the judgment
below. Third, it could have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted. A good argument can be made that the Court reached out unnecessarily
for this case; it rewrote the question presented in an abstract fashion not warranted
by the record, and perhaps it should have recognized that all this was a mistake.
The Court did none of these things. Instead, it tacked on a fourth and final
section of the opinion that adopted a much different tone and offered new
arguments for the conclusion." 9 Rather than seeking to determine whether the
religious speech in question was properly attributed to the school district or to the
individual student speaker, the Court shifted to an analysis of the school board's
subjective motivations for adopting the policy and to the supposed political
divisiveness of the policy.22° In striking contrast to the careful and evenhanded
tone of the first three sections of the opinion, the final section contained angry
denunciations of the school board and made sweeping constitutional judgments
based on dubious (and in one case, repudiated) constitutional doctrines.22' It was
this section that inspired the dissenters to complain of the majority's "disturbing"
'
tone of "hostility to all things religious in public life."222
It is difficult to reconcile this section of the opinion with the earlier parts. If
the fourth section is valid, then the Court's careful examination of the totality of
the circumstances in the first three sections was dictum. But if the Court's careful
analysis of the full context of the case was necessary to the decision, then the
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fourth section-which dispenses with careful analysis and decides the case on the
basis of broad pronouncements-was without foundation.
For the most part, the fourth section simply rested on the rhetorical device of
treating as self-evident the same conclusions that, in the earlier sections, had been
thought to require evidence going beyond the face of the policy. The Court
characterized the school board's arguments as "ask[ing] us to pretend that we do
not recognize what every Santa Fe High School student understands clearly" and
as "ask[ing] us to accept what is obviously untrue." ' 3 This is the judicial
equivalent of raising one's voice to a louder pitch in an argument instead of
providing proof of one's position.
More seriously, this section of the opinion relied upon two highly dubious
constitutional doctrines to explain why the facial challenge could succeed. First,
the Court found that the school district had an "unconstitutional purpose" of
"encourag[ing] prayer." '24 Second, the Court found that the policy would
'
encourage "divisiveness along religious lines."225
1. Legislative motive
A good argument can be made that bad legislative motive, in the absence of
any proven unconstitutional effect, is not a sufficient basis for exercising the power
of judicial review. 26 In any event, the Court has consistently held that a law
should not be struck down on this ground unless it is "motivated wholly by an
impermissible purpose." ' 7 That is an especially difficult conclusion to reach when
there has been .norecord evidence regarding the statutory purpose.
There are good reasons to be wary of striking down laws that are facially
neutral on the basis of claims of illegitimate purpose. (It must be assumed,
arguendo, that the policy could be understood as neutral, because otherwise there
would be no point to this section of the opinion.) When a school board (or other
governmental body) creates new opportunities for private speech, its motives are
inherently ambiguous. Maybe they wish to foster free speech, or more speech.
Maybe they have a favored message that they think will more likely be
communicated if they create the opportunity. Consider the example of a school
board attempting to decide whether to institute an equal access policy that would
allow student religious groups-along with other extracurricular groups-to meet on
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school facilities after classroom hours. Such a policy has been held constitutional
on the rationale that it allows a range of free speech activities."' It is possible,
however, that school officials might adopt the equal access policy with the
subjective intention that a student religious club would meet. (It is similarly
possible for equal access policies to be adopted in the hope that a gay rights group,
or some other group with a message favored by the administration, would take
advantage of the opportunity.) This should not affect its constitutionality.
Although the officials involved might have a private motivation of favoring one
viewpoint over another, the objective purpose of an equal access policy is to open
a forum for speech by students on all subjects, from all points of view. It is this
laudable objective purpose-not the forbidden private motivation-that should
control the outcome. As the Supreme Court explained in its decision upholding
the Equal Access Act:
Even if some. legislators were motivated by a conviction that religious
speech in particular was valuable and worthy of protection, that alone
would not invalidate the Act, because what is relevant is the legislative
purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators
who enacted the law. Because the Act on its face grants equal access to
both secular and religious speech, we think it clear that the Act's purpose
was not to 'endorse or disapprove of religion.'229
By the same reasoning, because the policy at issue in Santa Fe "on its face
grants equal access to both secular and religious speech," the Court should not
have concluded that it had an unconstitutional purpose, at least not without direct
evidence to that effect.23° In this case, there was no direct evidence regarding the
school board's purpose. Purpose was inferred from the statute. As we shall'see,
however, that inference was unwarranted.
The Court offered two arguments for illicit purpose based on the text of the
statute.23 ' It argued first that the term "solemnize" would encourage prayer,
because "[a] religious message is the most obvious method of solemnizing the
'
event."232
To be "the most obvious," however, is not the same as being the only
means of solemnizing an event. It is easy to imagine secular messages that would
"solemnize" the occasion-such as a statement about good sportsmanship,
recitation of poetry, or the singing of the school's alma mater. (Whether such
messages are likely depends on the social context, which takes the question outside
the ambit of a facial challenge.) In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
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of Hialeah, the Court faced an analogous linguistic issue.233 In Lukumi, a city
passed an ordinance forbidding the "ritual" slaughter of animals:
Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test of facial
neutrality because they use the words "sacrifice" and "ritual," words with
strong religious connotations. We agree that these words are consistent
with the claim of facial discrimination, but the argument is not
conclusive. The words "sacrifice" and "ritual" have a religious origin,
but current use admits also of secular meanings. 2
The Court held the ordinance unconstitutional only after consulting record
evidence that the city council in fact had targeted a particular religious practice
and had chosen the language specifically for that discriminatory purpose.235
Second, the Sante Fe Court argued that inclusion of the word "invocation" in
the policy was evidence that its purpose was to promote prayer.236 "Indeed," the
Court pointed out, "the only type of message that is expressly endorsed in the text
is an 'invocation'- a term that primarily describes an appeal for divine assistance
Thus, the expressed purposes of the policy encourage the selection of a
....
'
religious message." 237
That conclusion, however, does not follow. The policy uses
the disjunctive phrase "statement or invocation," thus making it plain that the
statement need not necessarily be an invocation. In a case involving an analogous
linguistic issue, the Court did not rely solely on the statutory language but
examined actual evidence regarding legislative intent. In Wallace v. Jaffree, the
Court considered the constitutionality of a state law authorizing a moment of
'
Like
silence in public school classrooms "for meditation or voluntary prayer."238
the Santa Fe policy, this statute contained a religious and an arguably secular term
in disjunction.239 The Court struck down the moment of silence law only on the
basis of testimony from the legislature sponsor that his purpose was "to return
voluntary prayer" to the public schools and that he had no other purpose.'l The
Court made clear that other, functionally identical, moment of silence laws might
be permissible.24'
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In Sante Fe, by contrast, the case had been litigated as a facial challenge, and
thus there was no record evidence regarding the school district's actual
intentions. 4 ' In the absence of record evidence, the Court made inferences,
apparently based on its own intuitions regarding the social context, the school
district's subjective purposes, and the student body's perceptions.243 This analysis,
it seems to me, went beyond the ambit of a facial challenge. More importantly, if
treated as a precedent, this sloppy approach to establishing illegitimate legislative
purpose could legitimize attacks on facially neutral statutes based on nothing more
than suspicion of bad motive.
2. Political divisiveness
As an alternative basis for deciding the case on a facial challenge, the Court
resurrected the long-repudiated idea that a policy can violate the Establishment
Clause by encouraging "divisiveness along religious lines."' The Court reasoned
that regardless of how the policy is implemented or whether a prayer is ever
delivered, the policy is unconstitutional because it "impermissibly imposes upon
the student body a majoritarian election on the subject of prayer." 5 The Court
stated that "[n]o further injury is required for the policy to fail a facial
challenge." 2' This conclusion was unwarranted on the facts and seriously
mistaken as a matter of doctrine.
The Court presumed that the Santa Fe policy "entrusts the inherently
nongovernmental subject of religion to a majoritarian vote."247 That is an
incomplete reading of the policy. Unlike a policy-such as that approved in Jones
v. ClearCreek Independent School District 8-which allows the student body to
vote on whether to have a prayer at the graduation ceremony, the student body
under the Santa Fe policy votes first on whether to have a pre-game speaker and
second on who that speaker will be.249 This is not the same thing as a vote on
prayer. To be sure, it might turn out-in actual practice-to be tantamount to a vote
on prayer; in which case it would be unconstitutional as applied. But on its face,
the policy is not about prayer; it is about any message that might solemnize the
pre-game ceremony. Elections could focus on anything. The argument, therefore,
provides no response to the facial challenge problem. If the policy explicitly called
for a vote about prayer, it would be unconstitutional on its face, without regard to
political divisiveness. Because the policy is about authorizing a message to be
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chosen by the speaker, however, which might or might not be a prayer, the
election might or might not turn into a referendum on prayer and thus might or
might not generate political divisiveness along religious lines. The political
divisiveness argument merely restates the question and gets no closer to an
answer.
The Court did not, and logically could not, claim that any student election of
a speaker is unconstitutional when the speaker might deliver a religious
message. 2" That would suggest that it is unconstitutional for the students to be
permitted to elect a commencement speaker, because the election could turn out
to be a referendum on religious talks. (It is not unusual for clergy, such as the
Rev. Jesse Jackson, to be chosen as commencement speaker.) To be sure, in some
circumstances, such an election could turn out to generate religious division-but
only in certain circumstances. While a policy that refers to "prayer" on its face is
susceptible to a facial challenge, a policy that contains no such reference can be
invalidated only in light of actual application and experience, which was not
available in this case.
More importantly, as a doctrinal matter, this invocation of the old "political
divisiveness" test was a serious mistake. The political divisiveness doctrine has
been repudiated many times in majority opinions of the Court-some of them
written by Justices who joined in the Santa Fe opinion-and for good reason. 5 It
may well be true that one of the underlying purposes of the Religion Clauses was
to reduce the likelihood of political divisiveness along religious lines. It is very
likely that government actions that violate either the Free Exercise or the
Establishment Clause also have the vice of exacerbating politico-religious
divisions. Yet, it is not coherent to treat political divisiveness as a an independent
basis for a constitutional challenge. Any number of legitimate political issues
create divisions along religious lines-including civil rights policy, family law
issues, foreign policy toward Israel, gay rights, parental rights, and confirmation
of cabinet officials, to namejust a few examples. We cannot say that government
policies that are divisive along religious lines are unconstitutional, for the simple
reason that divisiveness is a two-way street. Suppose that proposed policy A tends
to divide the nation along religious lines. If one religious group supports A and
another religious group opposes A, how do we know whether that makes A
constitutionally favored or not? Even if the court were able to identify which issues
carry the risk of divisiveness, the insight would provide no basis for deciding
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which side of the divisive conflict should prevail.
The Court's casual invocation of this doctrine, without mentioning the fact
that it was repudiated in earlier opinions, without explaining why it was doing so,
and without confronting the crushing academic criticism the doctrine has received,
was as strange as it was unfortunate. Even stranger is the fact that no Justice in
the majority-even Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who have criticized the
political divisiveness idea in the past and are not shy about writing concurring
opinions when the majority goes too far-held their tongues. I cannot imagine
why.
Section four of the Santa Fe opinion thus fails in its mission of explaining
why the case could be decided on a facial basis and, in the attempt, threatens to
upset sensible constitutional doctrine regarding legislative motivation and political
divisiveness. We can hope that the decision is remembered for its careful and fairminded analysis of the governmental-private line and not for this final and illconsidered section.
III. CONCLUSION
With the exception of section four of the Santa Fe opinion, the Supreme Court
in October Term 1999 made significant progress toward consensus about the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. Although the two decisions presented
victories to opposite wings of the Court and inspired anguished dissents, they both
hinged on the question of "state action." One of the most important features of
Religion Clause jurisprudence is that the limits apply to the government only. The
First Amendment was not intended to inhibit (or encourage) the religious
enthusiasm of the American people, but to make religious exercise free from
-official orthodoxy. When the government is neutral toward religion and private
persons are responsible for religious expression and activity, the Establishment
Clause is not implicated-even when religious activity takes place in public settings
or receives public benefits. Mitchell v. Helms thus held that parents can choose
religious schools, and religious schools can engage in religious instruction,
without forfeiting their right to share in generally available public benefits for
education.252 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe held that public
policies that are skewed in favor of prayer-even when neutral on their face-are
unconstitutional.253 Taken together, these decisions suggest, not a "balance"
between religion and secularism, but a complementary principle that religion is
a matter for private judgement and conviction.
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PROFESSOR AKHIL REED AMAR'S RESPONSE

PROFESSOR AMAR: As I have tried to explain in my paper,' I agree with just
about everything that Michael said. So let me just say a couple of words about
the methodological issue raised by stare decisis. When should the Court
overrule itself? When not? This is the only case last term, Mitchell is, where
the Supreme Court explicitly overruled any precedent whatsoever. So I think
when Erwin said this is a Court that defers to no one, doesn't defer to
Congress, doesn't defer to state legislatures, doesn't defer to police departments or school boards, doesn't defer to lower courts, doesn't defer to the
Ninth Circuit; well, it does defer to the United States Supreme Court. The
Court doesn't like overruling itself very much, see Dickerson2 for example on
Miranda.' See Stenberg,4 reaffirming Roe' and Casey,6 and not giving us
much more than a mind-numbing invocation of stare decisis.
So Mitchell is interesting because it openly overrules two cases, although
you can't even get a single opinion for that. It's sort of two different opinions
added together. The only other case last Term that I would say comes close
to overruling precedent isApprendi,' which distinguishes some cases. I think
Erwin is right in his logic, it's really quite interesting. And that connects up
with what Jon said about values of predictability, gradualism, incrementalism,
and stable expectations. Now here's the interesting thing on Mitchell,
although it overruled some cases, to actually follow the past doctrine would
have perhaps been more disruptive of the social fabric. It would have been to
undo a governmental program that had been operating well and in place for
twenty years or so. So here's an example of how sometimes actually deviating
from the precedents actually can be less destabilizing to the social fabric.
In Morrison, the back-to-basics approach would have actually upheld the
law, and, I think, been less destructive in some ways than the doctrinal
approach invoking the civil rights cases of 1883, which actually struck
something down. So these concerns about social fabric and reliance interest
and stability interestingly interact with the question whether to overrule or not
to overrule.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: Marcia Coyle of the National Law Journal now has some
questions for Professors McConnell and Amar.
MS. COYLE: I'm going to take one question and cede the rest of my time to the
audience.
Professor McConnell, it's December 1, 2001, two years after you argued
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and we later found out that you won Mitchell v. Helms,9 and you're back
before the Supreme Court. Yes, Al Gore won the election. Chief Justice
Ginsburg is happy to have you back because she wants to pick up on a
question that came up during the Mitchell v. Helms argument. It was a
question that seemed to cause considerable frustration with Justice Stevens,
Justice Souter, and I think it actually started with Chief Justice Rehnquist.
How far do you go now? How far after Mitchell v. Helms can we go? Can
the government provide a program that actually provides the bricks for the
religious school? Is there a limiting principle in Mitchell, or has the wall
come tumbling down?
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: In principle, bricks are no different than computers. The limiting principle is neutral allocation of aid. The aid itself must be
neutral in character.
MS. COYLE: So Justice O'Connor, who saw the plurality opinion as breathtakingly broad, was right. She felt it would almost surely pave the way for direct
aid to religious organizations, even if they used the funds for religious
purposes. So what if you're before the Court and you're defending federal aid
to a religious organization that's providing, say, social services in the wake
of federal welfare reform? Is that doable now after Mitchell v. Helms?
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: Well, of course this isn't just a hypothetical. As
part of the Welfare Act, Congress passed something called the Charitable
Choice Act.
MS. COYLE: Yes, and there are challenges. There is litigation pending.
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: Well, it hasn't gotten past the district court. There
are various cases that are percolating up.
MS. COYLE: So I'm asking you to look down the road.
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: I would expect the law is going to be upheld. But
of course, since you're Chief Justice Ginsburg and therefore we are assuming
that Vice President Gore is in office, who is likely going to have as one of his
litmus tests for appointment of Supreme Court Justices be this very issue, I'm
not making predictions as to what any Supreme Court will do under that
scenario.
PROFESSOR CHEMERINSKY: I don't agree with Professor McConnell either
as to what the appropriate theory of the Establishment Clause should be or
how he predicts what the Supreme Court is likely to do under existing
precedent. I believe that the government should not be subsidizing religious
education. I believe there should be a separation from church and state. And
if there was time, I would explain why I believe it is consistent with the
structure and meaning of the Establishment Clause.
But in terms of the precedent that exists right now, we've got to
remember there are five votes in Mitchell v. Helms that the government
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cannot subsidize religious education. Thomas' position was emphatically
rejected by a majority of the Court, and I think that would put charitable
choice and even certain voucher programs very much in danger.
MS. COYLE: That was a question I was going to pose: Do you think the voucher
supporters have Breyer's vote, at this stage?
DEAN VARAT: Because I disagree too, I'd like to put in a word for separation.
It may well be that there is a choice between separation and equality, although
I tend to think that is a false dichotomy. That is, I think separation itself is,
in significant part, a mechanism for preventing inequality, particularly in the
context of huge fights within the public sphere or over the allocation of
monies that will disproportionately go to religious schools. It's one thing to
talk about formal equality, and I understand all those are powerful arguments,
but I think there's also the question of practical equality.
And I want to add one other thing to my good friend Akhil's comments,
which is that I think, on a documentarian basis, one could make as strong an
argument that separation is the big idea, as he made for equality. For
example, the religious test oath clause seems to me at least as much in support
of a separation notion as it is of an equality notion, and I think the same could
be true about attempting to continue the notion that people not be compelled
to subsidize religion with their tax dollars.
PROFESSOR JAMES: Two things very quickly. Professor Amar, do you agree
with Professor McConnell on the voucher vote tally or at least with the
speculation regarding whether the votes are there in favor of the voucher
program?
PROFESSOR AMAR: Professor McConnell litigates before the Court, and he's
a better vote counter than I, so I wouldn't want to contradict him. The only
thing I would say is Justice Breyer doesn't always write, and Justice Breyer
has joined in the past quite inconsistent opinions indeed. He and Justice
Stevens were the only ones who joined an opinion by Justice Souter concurring in the Southworth ° case, and that opinion has a footnote that's actually
completely inconsistent with Justice Breyer's approach. So, byjoining Justice
O'Connor in Mitchell, I think he's a riddle embraced in an enigma, within a
mystery.
PROFESSOR JAMES: And finally, Professor McConnell, why is it that the Court
has never really addressed the definition of religion or at least seems to be
shying away from it? Why is it that education and so-called secular
institutions are not considered religious or normative? What kind of activity
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is nonreligious?
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: I think there are two reasons they haven't tackled
it. One is that very few concrete disputes have hinged upon it. It has very
rarely come to them. The second is it's an extraordinarily hard problem, and
hard partly because it cuts two different ways. Most people are very interested
in a broad definition of religion for purpose of Free Exercise protection. But
a very broad definition of religion for Establishment Clause purposes is
unthinkable, because it would suggest, for example, that the government
would not be able to put its affirmative weight behind any of the conscientious
positions that might be described as not religious, but close enough for Free
Exercise purposes.
PROFESSOR JAMES: I gather then you are at least partially in favor of the
congressional approach which construes the term broadly for purposes of
exemptions from the draft when the draft is imposed?
PROFESSOR McCONNELL: Actually, I tend to be a narrow-definition person
precisely because I think that a broad definition makes the Establishment
Clause sort of a wrecking operation for government. I'm not keen on those
Supreme Court decisions to which you refer.
PROFESSOR KMIEC: We turn now to the freedom of speech, and our presenter
is Kathleen Sullivan.

